The value of economic expertise in competition litigation: Insights from Which? v Qualcomm

On 10 June 2026, the Competition Appeal Tribunal (“CAT”) approved a settlement agreement between (i) the Consumers’ Association known as “Which?” in its capacity as class representative (“CR”) for British consumers, and (ii) Qualcomm. [1] The claim alleged that Qualcomm used its dominance in supplying mobile phone baseband chipsets to extract higher patent royalties from Apple and Samsung. Under the settlement, each party would pay its own costs and no payment would be made to the class of consumers, a so-called “drop-hands” settlement. [2] This was an eleventh-hour resolution when the Trial 1 judgment was “at an advanced stage”. [3] In approving the settlement, the CAT found that “There were substantial evidential problems” and “The case was therefore likely to fail on the facts”.[4]

Jorge Padilla and Lau Nilausen were instructed by Qualcomm in the proceedings. This article reflects on two questions: first, what role can economic expertise play in competition litigation cases where the factual evidence about the alleged conduct is decisive; and second, could better use of economic evidence have brought the moment of reckoning in this case forward, for the benefit of all involved?

The views expressed in this article are the views of the authors only and do not necessarily represent the views of Compass Lexecon, its management, its subsidiaries, its affiliates, its employees, or its clients.

This article focuses on three points:

• The relationship between facts and economic theory

Not every factual dispute needs an economist. Economic analysis adds value when it helps explain and interpret the evidence beyond what the factual material and legal arguments already establish. A theory that does not fit the facts needs, at best, further work. The starting question, as the CAT has noted, should be: what does the case require that an economist can provide?

• How economics can give voice to the facts by identifying and testing the factual implications of a theory of harm

For a theory of harm to be verifiable or falsifiable and thereby testable, its economic logic needs to be compatible with some fact pattern and incompatible with others. In this case, our analysis economic tested whether manufacturers that bought a larger share of their chipsets from Qualcomm agreed higher royalties for Standard Essential Patent (“SEP”) licences – as the theory of harm implied. We found no such pattern. That, in our view, makes the theory of harm less plausible. The trial exchanges illustrated the importance of such tests and of interpreting the results of those tests consistently, whichever side they favour.

• How economic analysis can help clarify and narrow the dispute before trial

Some ambiguity about a competition claim is understandable at certification, before disclosure reveals many of the relevant facts. With hindsight, however, this case illustrates why parties should winnow, refine and narrow the issues as proceedings advance. In particular, the alleged mechanism should be clear before trial: retaining ambiguity can obscure the role of particular arguments, allow contradictions to persist and prevent meaningful testing. The CAT’s recent emphasis on using expert reports and joint statements to resolve disagreements is therefore welcome. The focus of that process also matters. Testing theories against the facts can help direct attention towards the issues and disagreements that matter most.

---

References