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EDUCATION

2000 M.A., Economics (Fields: Industrial Organization, Game Theory, Information Economics), Northwestern University

1997 B.A., Economics and B.A. Applied Mathematics, University of California at Berkeley

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

2013-present *Compass Lexecon*
Senior Vice President

2008-2013 *Compass Lexecon*
Vice President

2007-2008 *Competition Policy Associates Inc.*
Vice President

2004-2006 *Competition Policy Associates Inc.*
Senior Economist

2000-2004 *AES Consulting, LLC*
Senior Economist

1998-2000 *Northwestern University, Department of Economics*
Teaching Assistant (Microeconomics, Antitrust and Regulation)

Fall 1998 *Arthur Andersen Consulting*
Independent Consultant

1995-1997 *University of California at Berkeley, Department of Economics*
Research Associate

CONSULTING PROJECTS

Antitrust and Damages

1. For United Allergy Services, estimated the damages resulting from an alleged group boycott by insurers of United Allergy Services provision of allergy testing and immunotherapy services in conjunction with primary care physicians.
2. For the PGA TOUR, analyzed the reliability of an analysis of the damages incurred by Hank Haney as a result of the PGA TOUR's alleged unlawful interference with Mr. Haney's contract with Sirius XM Radio.
3. For Nippon Chemi-Con, assessed the extent to which the alleged communications among certain manufacturers of capacitors were likely to have broad-based impact on the prices charged by Nippon Chemi-Con's U.S. subsidiary.
4. For General Motors, analyzed whether it would be possible to establish using common proof that a proposed class of automobile purchasers overpaid for their vehicles on a class-wide basis due to General Motors' alleged failure to disclose certain ignition-related defects earlier than it did.
5. For Live Nation, analyzed the relationship between the share of the tickets to a concert that are withheld from sale to the general public and the prices for tickets to that concert in the secondary market.
6. For Ticketmaster, analyzed plaintiff Songkick's allegations that Ticketmaster used its alleged monopoly power in the alleged relevant market for venue ticketing services to monopolize the alleged relevant market for artist presale ticketing services by limiting third party ticketing service providers' access to ticketing rights at venues at which Ticketmaster provides primary ticketing services. Examined the proper relevant antitrust market(s) for analyzing the alleged conduct, Ticketmaster's position in the primary ticketing services market, the impact of Ticketmaster's third-party artist presale ticketing policies on Songkick, and the procompetitive rationales for Ticketmaster's policies.
7. For JTEKT, Nachi, NSK, NTN, Schaeffler, and SKF, assessed whether it would be possible to establish using common proof that a proposed class of direct purchasers of automotive bearings were impacted on a class-wide basis by an alleged conspiracy among automotive bearing manufacturers to manipulate the bid processes of certain large automobile manufacturers and to increase the prices of bearings to pass through increases in steel costs.
8. For Qualcomm, in response to an inquiry by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, examined the competitive implications of its policy of only supplying cellular chips to mobile phone and tablet makers that have a license to Qualcomm's standards essential patents.

9. For Qualcomm, in response to an inquiry by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, assessed the most economically efficient level in the mobile phone and tablet production chain for licensing its cellular patents.
10. For Invivio, in response to an inquiry by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, analyzed whether its exclusive agreements with medical device manufacturers enabled it to monopolize the market for implantable polyether ether ketone. Assessed whether the agreements limited rival input manufacturers' ability to compete, and examined the procompetitive justifications for those agreements.
11. For Hitachi, LG, Mitsubishi, Panasonic, Philips, Samsung, Thomson, and Toshiba, analyzed whether it would be possible to establish using common proof that proposed classes of direct and indirect purchasers of cathode ray tubes (CRTs), CRT televisions, and CRT computer monitors were impacted on a class-wide basis by an alleged conspiracy among CRT manufacturers to elevate CRT prices. Assessed the effectiveness of the alleged cartel and its impact on prices for CRTs and CRT televisions and monitors.
12. For Avery-Dennison, analyzed allegations that 3M maintained its alleged monopoly in the high performance retroreflective sheeting market through a combination of actions including manipulation of the standards setting process. Estimated the antitrust damages to Avery Dennison from 3M's alleged anticompetitive conduct.
13. For Live Nation (formerly a division of Clear Channel Communications), analyzed allegations by a class of concertgoers that Clear Channel used its alleged dominance of regional rock radio station markets and rock concert venues to foreclose rival promoters from the alleged market for rock concert promotion. Also evaluated allegations that Clear Channel colluded with other concert promoters and engaged in predatory bidding for rock acts. Lastly, assessed reasonableness of Plaintiffs' economic expert's damages analysis.
14. For Micron, analyzed plaintiff Rambus's allegations that the major DRAM suppliers, under the guise of various standard-setting organizations, conspired to boycott plaintiff's proprietary technology, RDRAM. Examined whether the defendants' actions were consistent with a boycott of RDRAM, including an analysis of whether defendants' prices were consistent with an agreement to raise the price of RDRAM relative to the competing standard. Supported expert and legal team through trial.
15. For Apple and AT&T, analyzed issues involving class certification surrounding allegations that Apple and AT&T conspired to monopolize the putative aftermarkets for iPhone voice and data services and iPhone applications. Assessed whether the existence of competitive harm through higher iPhone service, higher applications prices, or loss of product choice could be established using proof common to all Plaintiffs and whether any corresponding damages could be estimated using a common methodology.

16. "An Economic Perspective on the Antitrust Case against Intel," October 2009, white paper (with Robert Willig and Jonathan Orszag). For the Computer and Communications Industry Association, provided an economic framework for analyzing whether Intel's loyalty payments and other business conduct were likely to harm competition. Discussed features of the microprocessor industry that play an important role in the application of that framework.
17. "Assessment of Microsoft's Behaviour in the Browser Market," May 2009, submitted to the European Commission (with Andrea Lofaro, Jan Peter van der Veer, Jonathan Orszag, and Assaf Eilat). For Google, analyzed Microsoft's response to the Commission's allegations that the tying of Internet Explorer to Windows had foreclosed rivals from the web browser market.
18. "The Impact of Merger-Related Debt on Pfizer's Ability to Compete," May 2009, submitted to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (with Richard Gilbert). For Pfizer, analyzed whether the debt used to finance Pfizer's acquisition of Wyeth would constrain Pfizer's ability to compete effectively.
19. "An Economic Perspective on the Microsoft Internet Explorer Tying Case," April 2009, submitted to the European Commission (with Andrea Lofaro, Jan Peter van der Veer, Jonathan Orszag, and Assaf Eilat). For Google, analyzed the Commission's allegations that Microsoft foreclosed rivals from the web browser market by tying Internet Explorer to Windows. Proposed a set of objectives that a remedy would need to meet to ensure competition on merits in the market for web browsers.
20. For Vident, examined allegations that Dentsply maintained its monopoly in the artificial teeth market through exclusive dealing. Assessed whether Dentsply's exclusive agreements with artificial tooth dealers were likely to foreclose Vident and other rival artificial teeth manufacturers from the market and whether these agreements were justified by alleged efficiencies.
21. For a computer industry consortium, analyzed allegations that Microsoft engaged in exclusionary conduct in various server software markets using a combination of bundled discounts and various non-price actions. Developed a single framework to analyze the combination of alleged price and non-price exclusionary conduct.
22. For Hynix, Micron, Nanya, and Samsung, assessed the competitive effects of conduct undertaken by Rambus while a member of a JEDEC subcommittee tasked with formulating DRAM standards. Examined the proper delineation of the relevant markets, assessed Rambus's market power prior to and following the promulgation of the relevant standards, and analyzed the standards setting process at JEDEC and the impact of Rambus's actions on members' decision-making. Supported expert and legal team through trial.
23. For Abbott, examined the competitive impact of Abbott's alleged predatory innovation in relation to its cholesterol drug, TriCor. Constructed a model to estimate the damages incurred by the direct purchaser class, the indirect purchaser class, and two generic drug manufacturers.

24. For the Carlyle Group, analyzed whether the practice of forming private equity consortia to bid on targets resulted in reduced competition in the private equity market. Examined private equity deal prices to determine whether the presence of consortia tended to result in higher or lower deal prices.
25. For IBM, analyzed the economic implications of assigning control rights to operating system code developed by IBM in the event that IBM's UNIX licenses were found to be ambiguous on this issue. Assessed the potential impact the counterclaim defendant's copyright misuse had on competition.
26. For Micron, analyzed plaintiff Tessera's claim that the major DRAM suppliers conspired to boycott third party licensors, including Tessera's DRAM packaging technology. Assessed whether defendants' actions were consistent with their unilateral interests and whether any joint efforts were consistent with procompetitive standard setting efforts.
27. For Sempra Energy, evaluated plaintiffs' claims that an alleged agreement to restrict the supply of interstate natural gas pipeline capacity to California resulted in billions of dollars in overpayments for natural gas and electricity during the California energy crisis of 2000-2001. Constructed a bidding model for electricity supply and applied it to a database of generators' actual hourly supply bids. Supported the legal team through trial.
28. For the NCAA, evaluated plaintiff's claim that the NCAA attempted to monopolize the market for postseason basketball tournaments. Analyzed the reasonableness of plaintiff's proposed relevant market, the potential procompetitive rationales for certain rules implemented by the NCAA, and whether there was any harm to consumers.
29. For Liquorland, responded to claims by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) that Liquorland and Woolworths attempted to substantially lessen competition in packaged takeaway liquor markets by objecting to a number of new entrants' license applications and proposing allegedly restrictive agreements in return for withdrawing their objections.
30. For Carpenter and Vallourec, in a matter involving an alleged contract breach in the high-end steel industry, evaluated the reasonableness of plaintiffs' expert's damages estimates.
31. For Monsanto, assessed plaintiffs' allegations that Monsanto attempted to monopolize the U.S. non-selective herbicide market and that it entered into a contract in restraint of trade with The Scotts Company, in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
32. For Air Canada, Air France, and Lufthansa, evaluated price-fixing claims brought by the travel agency industry in response to decreasing base commissions for airline travel.

33. For Aventis, evaluated the effects an agreement between a brand name and a generic drug manufacturer had on indirect purchasers of the prescription drug, Cardizem CD.
34. For Amgen, constructed a model to estimate price erosion damages resulting from a licensee's alleged contract breach. Supported two experts and legal team during arbitration hearings.
35. For Barnes & Noble in a case filed under the Robinson-Patman Act, evaluated competitive trends in the bookselling industry and responded to plaintiffs' economic expert's liability claims and damages estimates.

Mergers and Joint Ventures

36. For Illumina and GRAIL, analyzed the likely competitive effects of the proposed vertical merger on competition in the marketplace for multi-cancer early detection tests.
37. For AT&T and Dobson, assessed whether the proposed merger was likely to harm competition in local markets in which both wireless carriers actively competed or held spectrum rights.
38. For AT&T and Comcast, assessed whether a proposed merger, by increasing the concentration among buyers of television programming, was likely to result in a reduction of the quality or quantity of programs supplied.
39. For American Airlines and British Airways, examined the competitive effect of a proposed strategic alliance. Performed econometric analysis of airline pricing models, passenger substitution patterns, and carrier capacity allocation.
40. For the Department of Justice, in its investigation of Cendant's acquisition of Homestore.com, assessed the competitive landscape of the on-line real estate listing industry and projected the impact of the proposed transaction on competition.
41. For Pilkington and Visteon, prepared economic and statistical analyses in support of a proposed merger in the flat glass industry.

Other Engagements

42. For SoundExchange, utilized cooperative game theory models to analyze the appropriate royalty rates for digital transmission of sound recordings by commercial noninteractive webcasters operating under a statutory license.

43. For Toyota Motor Corporation Australia (“TMCA”), examined the reasonableness of the transfer prices Toyota Motor Corporation (“TMC”) charged TMCA for vehicles. Compared these transfer prices to the prices TMC charged non-integrated distributors, adjusting for differences in the product characteristics of vehicles purchased by TMCA and the non-integrated distributors. Constructed a series of econometric models to account for the different economic conditions faced by various distributors (which were in different countries) and any differences in the functionality they provided.

44. “The State of the Private Equity Sector,” December 2008, white paper (with Jonathan Orszag and Nicolas Beck). For the Private Equity Council, analyzed the state of the private equity industry with a particular focus on the impact of the ongoing financial crisis.